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In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates.
I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of
promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where
memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies,
the surviving risk takers will have lower average ability whenever they have a higher survival rate.
Further, even if more risk takers than non risk takers are promoted in the beginning of the hierarchy,
that will be reversed over time. The risk takers will eventually have a lower survival rate, but higher
ability. As a consequence of these differences, the various requirements of employment law cannot
simultaneously be satisfied. Further, if promotion standards are chosen to maximize profit, the standards
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In this paper, I study the e⁄ect of risk taking on promotion in hierarchies,
where promotion at each stage depends on a signal of ability. The motivation
comes from a substantial body of evidence that males are more risk taking
than females, and from the continuing controversy about why males and
females have di⁄erent patterns of success in labor markets. Granting the
premise that the genders di⁄er in risk taking, does this have explanatory
power for labor markets? The answer is mixed, partly because the theorems
below can be applied to labor markets in di⁄erent ways.
The theorems proved below compare promotions drawn from two popu-
lations, one of which generates accurate signals of ability and the other of
which generates noisy signals of ability. The premise is that true abilities
have the same distribution in both populations, at least initially, but that
agents in one population give a noisy signal to the decision maker. This is
a reduced-form hypothesis that might follow from preferences and optimiz-
ing behavior, or might re￿ ect behavior that is hard-wired. This distinction
does not matter for the theorems that I prove, although it matters for the
interpretation.
I introduce two types of promotion hierarchies: those with memory and
those without memory. In a hierarchy without memory, promotion at stage
t depends only on the signal of ability generated at stage t. With memory,
promotion can depend on the entire history of signals. Hierarchies such
as sports tournaments do not have memory, since survival depends only on
winning the current match. Hierarchies such as academic labor markets
have memory, although promotion would typically depend more heavily on
current performance than on past performance. To emphasize the distinction
between hierarchies with memory and those without, I assume for the case
of memory that all past signals are used symmetrically. There is no extra
weight given to recent performance.
In section 2, I describe a simple model of hierarchical labor markets. In
section 3, I show how promotion standards interact with risk taking, and
prove an impossibility result related to employment law. Even with one
period of promotion, it is impossible to ￿nd a promotion policy that simul-
taneously (a) promotes according to gender-blind standards, (b) promotes
2at equal rates from the two populations, and (c) ensures that the promoted
pools have equal expected abilities. The various legal principles about dis-
crimination are in con￿ ict.
In section 4, I study hierarchies with and without memory, focussing
on two important statistical properties ￿ survival rates and the expected
abilities of survivors. With gender-blind promotion standards, males may
be advantaged at the beginning due to their risk-taking behavior, but this
will be reversed at the end. Further, any advantage in the promotion rate
coincides with a de￿cit in ability. If males have a higher promotion rate at the
beginning, they will have lower average ability than the promoted females,
but this will also be reversed at the end.
In section 5, I turn to private objectives rather than social objectives.
Di⁄erent standards will be used in the two cases that (a) promotion means
changing employers and (b) all promotions take place within a ￿rm. If a
￿rm only keeps a worker for a single period, then the promotion standards
that materialize will equalize the marginal abilities of promoted workers in
the two populations. But if promotions are within a ￿rm, the ￿rm has an
incentive to preserve options on the employees with noisy signals, since more
information will be collected later. At early stages, the ￿rm will retain risk
takers who have lower expected ability than is required of the non risk takers.
If the males are the risk takers, males are favored.
Since the paper is motivated by the considerable evidence that males
are more risk taking than females,1 I will refer to risk takers as males, and
non risk takers as females. However, although the males￿risk taking may
lead to noise in formal labor-market signals like exams, there are other so-
cial phenomena that may cause females￿signals to be noisier than those of
males. Promotions often rely on informal evidence like letters of reference.
If males are observed more closely than females, then it may be females who
have noisier signals. Informal evidence is often under the control of the ob-
1See Eckel and Grossman (2002) on gambling behavior, Bajtesmit and Bernasek (1996),
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) and Charness and Gneezy (2004) on investment behavior,
Slovic (1966), Mittal and Dhade (2007), and Ginsburg and Miller (1982) for experiments
with children, and Espinosa and Gardeazabal (2005) on gender di⁄erences in exam strate-
gies. See Eckel and Grossman (2005a) for a comparison of the results from ￿eld studies
versus contextual environmental experiments. See Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) for an
evolutionary argument for the gender di⁄erence.
3server rather than the candidate. An academic in hope of promotion cannot
commandeer attendance at a seminar, and an employee cannot demonstrate
competence without being given a task. If opportunities to give informal ev-
idence are more available to males than females, then the signals generated
by males may be more accurate than those of females, and we must reverse
our understanding of the theorems in this paper.
2 Risk Takers, Non Risk Takers, and Hierar-
chies
Suppose that agents￿abilities are a random variable A with distribution G
and density g, ￿nite variance, and support equal to the real line. Males and
females have the same distribution of abilities. A male with ability A = a
generates a sequence of independent random signals Z1;Z2;:::Zt;::: each with
distribution ￿(￿ja), density ￿(￿ja), mean a, ￿nite variance, and support equal
to the real line.






when z1 > z2 and a1 > a2 (1)
I sometimes use the following more speci￿c assumption that the signal Z is
ability plus noise.
Assumption A: Conditional on A = a, for each t, the random variable Zt
is equal to a + Ut, where U1;U2;:::Ut;::: are distributed independently with
density ￿u, and ￿(zja) = ￿u (z ￿ a). The densities g and ￿u are single peaked
and symmetric around 0, with ￿nite variance and supports equal to the real
line.
Promotion standards are a sequence of real numbers, c = c1;c2;:::ct;::: in-
terpreted as thresholds for promotion. Due to the monotone likelihood ratio,
the threshold policy selects agents that have higher ability in expectation.
Say that the promotion standards are gender blind if all agents face
the same promotion standards. When I do not assume gender-blind pro-
4motion standards, I will refer to the males￿promotion standards by m =
m1;m2;:::mt;::: and to the females￿promotion standards by f = f1;f2;:::ft;:::
Say that the promotion standards c are bounded if there exist c;￿ c such
that c ￿ ct ￿ ￿ c for all t.
A female with ability a survives to stage t if a ￿ cd for each d = 1;:::t.
The probability of survival SF





0 if a < cd for some d ￿ t.
1 if a ￿ cd for each d ￿ t.



























To de￿ne the survival rate of males, I distinguish between promotion hi-
erarchies that have memory and those that do not. In a hierarchy without
memory, promotion at stage t, conditional on survival to t￿1, depends only
on the performance in period t. In a hierarchy with memory, promotion at
stage t, conditional on survival to t ￿ 1, depends on the cumulative per-
formance to t. I will study the special case in which promotion depends
symmetrically on all the previous signals, through the mean.
2.1 Survival in hierarchies without memory
Say that a male survives to t in a hierarchy without memory if Zd ￿ cd, for





t (a;c) = ￿
t
d=1(1 ￿ ￿(cdja))

















d=1 [1 ￿ ￿(cdja)]da
(3)















d=1 [1 ￿ ￿(cdja)] R 1
￿1 g(a)￿t
d=1 [1 ￿ ￿(cdja)]da
da
(4)
A marginal survivor at stage t is an agent who generates signal Zt = ct.












2.2 Survival in hierarchies with memory
For the random sequence Z1;Z2;:::Zt;::: de￿ne the sequence of sample means
￿ Z1; ￿ Z2;::: ￿ Zt;::: where ￿ Zt = 1
t
Pt
k=1 Zk for each t. Say that a male survives
to t in a hierarchy with memory if ￿ Zd ￿ cd, for d = 1;:::t.
When A = a, denote the probability of survival to t by ￿ SM
t (a;c), which









































A marginal survivor at stage t is an agent who generates signal ￿ Zt = ct.
With memory, the probability of being marginal at stage t depends not only
6on the stage-t signal Zt, but on the accumulated success up to that point, Pt￿1
k=1 Zk. Let ￿ g (￿jt;c) be the probability density describing the distribution
of ability, conditional on surviving to t ￿ 1 and being marginal at t: Then




































At each a, the probability of survival, ￿ SM
t (a;c), is decreasing with t, and
bounded below by zero. Hence the sequence converges at each a. Let
￿ S




t (a;c) for each a 2 R
In a hierarchy with memory, the limit distribution of surviving risk takers
has density de￿ned by the following.
g (a) ￿ SM (a;c) R 1
￿1 g (a) ￿ SM (a;c)da
(7)
I show in Lemma 7 below that the support is [￿ c;1), where ￿ c = limsupct.
Because the survival function ￿ SM
t (￿;c) is increasing, the limit function
￿ SM (￿;c) is nondecreasing.
3 Antidiscrimination goals: an impossibility
result
Before turning to how promotion plays out in a hierarchy, I use a single round
of promotion to show how di⁄erences in risk taking create a con￿ ict among
the following three natural objectives of labor policy:
7a, z
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Figure 1: First stage of the hierarchy
￿ gender-blind promotion standards
￿ equal survival rates
￿ equal abilities of survivors.
In ￿gure 1, the distribution of abilities A (hence the distribution of signals
generated by females) is shown by the density g. For this purpose, suppose
that Assumption A holds. Then the distribution of the signal Z generated
by males is a mean-preserving spread of g. The marginal distribution of Z
is represented by the density ~ ￿ in ￿gure 1.
Suppose the males￿promotion standard at stage 1 is m1. The resulting
probability of survival is the area to the right of m1. If the promotion stan-
dard is gender blind, all females with signal (ability) above m1 are also pro-
moted. However, there will be fewer females than males, provided m1 > 0,
since ~ ￿ is a mean-preserving spread of g.
At the same time, females who exceed the standard m1 have higher av-
erage ability than males. This follows from a very general result, stated in
Lemma 1 below, that the average ability of surviving males is lower than
the average ability of surviving females in any period where males have a
higher survival rate. We thus see immediately ￿and it is stated formally
in Proposition 2 ￿that gender-blind standards are incompatible with equal
promotion rates and with equal abilities. To equalize the survival rates, the
female promotion standard must be lower, namely, fn
1 in ￿gure 1, and to
8equalize abilities, the female promotion standard must be lower still, namely
fa
1.
That the promotion standards are ordered as drawn is stated in Proposi-
tion 2.
Lemma 1 [If male have a higher survival rate than females, males have lower
average ability.] Let (m;f) be promotion standards for males and females.
Suppose that the survival rate of males is no smaller than the survival rate
























Then the expected ability of a random surviving male is smaller than the
expected ability of a random surviving female:
E
M [Ajm;t] < E
F [Ajf;t] (8)
respectively, ￿ E
M [Ajm;t] < E
F [Ajf;t] (9)
The lemma is proved in the appendix. It uses essentially no assumptions
on the distributions or promotion standards, and is thus very general. The
intuition is simply that, because males generate noisy signals, mistakes are
made in promoting them. Some high ability males are not promoted, and
some low ability males are promoted. In contrast, no mistakes are made
in promoting females. Hence, if males and females are promoted in equal
numbers, the average ability of the surviving males must be lower.
Proposition 2 [The impossibility of equalizing survival rates, abilities and
standards] Let m be the promotion standards for males. Let fn (respectively
fa) be promotion standards for females such that their survival rate (respec-




(b) If assumption A holds and m1 > 0, then fn
1 < m1.



























then the expected ability of male sur-
vivors would be smaller than that of females at stage 1, a contradiction.
(b) Using Assumption A, the distribution of ability second-order domi-
nates the distribution of the signal Z. Both have mean 0, so for m1 > 0,
the probability that a male survives (namely, the probability that Z > m1)
exceeds the probability that a female survives according to the same stan-
dard (the probability that A > m1). Hence, to increase the probability that
a female survives, and in particular to equalize the survival rates, it must
hold that fn
1 < m1.
Proposition 2 illustrates why ￿a¢ rmative action￿in labor markets is a
vexed issue. It is not possible at the same time to equalize numbers, equalize
abilities, and also to satisfy the procedural objective of having gender-blind
standards.2
However, employment law seems to have all three objectives. Antidiscrim-
ination law in the U.S. dates mainly to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
and its extension in the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act.3 These
Acts disallow disparate treatment by employers based on race, color, sex,
national origin, or religion, with respect to hiring, promotion, compensation,
or termination decisions.4 At the same time, an employer￿practices might
run afoul of Title VII if they have a disparate impact on a protected group.5
2Spitzer (1979) makes a similar argument, showing how courts and agencies must bal-
ance objectives which can be mutually inconsistent. Most pertinently, he applies his analy-
sis to the Bakke decision in which the split decision of the Supreme Court is largely due
to the fact that di⁄erent justices were concerned with di⁄erent objectives, all legitimate,
which cannot simultaneously be satisi￿ed.
3A great deal has been written on the legal details and their impact. On the economic
side, see Rodgers (2006). The chapter by Holzer and Neumark outlines the broad contours
of the law. For a history of how the law developed, see Blumrosen (1993), and for detail
on the evidentiary conundrums that arise, see, for example, Krieger (1995).
4The more pro-active notion of ￿a¢ rmative action￿ originates in Executive Orders
10925 (1961), 11246 (1965,1967), 11625 (1971) of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon ad-
ministrations, respectively, aimed at federal contractors.
5The ban on disparate impacts evolved from policies of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), which was created to enforce the Civil Rights Act. See
Blumrosen (1993), 73-75 and Leiter and Leiter (2002), 43-47. In the absence of clear
10Whereas disparate treatment concerns the individual, and in particular,
whether the employer intended to discriminate against the individual, dis-
parate impact is about the e⁄ects of an employment practice on an entire
group. The employer￿ s intent is not at issue in disparate impact cases. A Title
VII disparate-impact violation results when a seemingly neutral employment
practice a⁄ects opportunities in ways that are not race- or gender-neutral,
and where the employer cannot prove that the practice is justi￿ed under Title
VII￿ s business necessity defense.6
Proposition 2 points out that the bans on disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact are contradictory. Title VII insists on gender-blind employ-
ment practices, but gender-blind employment practices lead to disparate im-
pacts on the numbers promoted and on survivors￿abilities. These disparate
impacts cannot be remedied by gender-blind promotion standards. Under the
conditions of Proposition 2, the standards for females must be lower than for
males early in the hierarchy, but (as we will see) higher as the hierarchy
progresses.
The contradiction between gender- or race-blindness and disparate im-
pact surfaces in personnel policies that seem incomprehensible.7 MIT￿ s Hu-
man Resources page8 poses the question ￿Is a¢ rmative action an employ-
ment quota system?￿Since ￿quotas are expressly forbidden by federal law,￿
the answer is that if ￿underutilization￿of minority groups is discovered, ...
￿placement goals are established .. Goals are targets, not quotas.￿The page
de￿nitions or a clear legislative intent behind the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC pursued
policies that imputed to the law an ambition to improve the economic circumstances of
minorities. This led to policies against disparate impact that were enunciated as law by
the Supreme Court in Griggs.
6Krieger (1995) discusses why it is di¢ cult to prove discrimination under both theories.
She argues that disparate treatment may result from subtle stereotypes even where there
is no discriminatory intent. Where there are patterns and practices of discrimination,
also known as systemic disparate treatment, she argues that disparate impact theory is
like a software ￿patch,￿ (p. 1227). Although disparate impact theory circumvents the
intent requirement, it creates problems that make judges reluctant to apply it. More-
over, Krieger argues that, in response to disparate impact theory, employers have shifted
from quanti￿able criteria like test scores to subjective standards involving unquanti￿able
variables.
7That contradictions arise from competing values has been convincingly discussed in
the case of race by Edley (1996).
8http://web.mit.edu/hr/aa/what_is.html
11does not explain the di⁄erence between targets and quotas, but asserts that
there is no con￿ ict between targets and ￿principles of merit.￿Proposition 2
suggests otherwise.
4 The hierarchies
I now turn to what happens as the hierarchy continues after the ￿rst stage.
In particular, I assume there are in￿nitely many periods of promotion. The
in￿nite sequence is unrealistic, but reveals a pattern for late stages that might
otherwise be obscure. In particular, with gender-blind standards, there
is a reversal in the relative numbers and relative abilities of the surviving
populations of males and females. At the beginning of the hierarchy, under
the reasonable conditions of ￿gure 1, gender-blind strategies lead to a higher
survival rate among males than females, but lower ability. At the end, this
is reversed. I show that the reversal occurs in hierarchies with and without
memory.
4.1 The hierarchy without memory
I ￿rst discuss how the hierarchy without memory plays out. Proposition 4
says that, in a hierarchy with gender blind standards, there is eventually a
higher survival rate among females, but they have lower ability. This is
essentially because males have an opportunity to throw themselves out of
the pool at every stage, and will eventually do so, except possibly those with
very high ability.
Lemma 3 is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 3 [Only males with very high ability survive in the limit.] Let
m = m1;m2;:::mt;::: be bounded promotion standards for a hierarchy without
memory. Then
(a) Given " > 0, there exists ~ t such that for t > ~ t, the survival rate (3)
of males at stage t is less than ".
12(b) Given ￿ 2 (0;1) and x > 0, there exists ~ t such that for t > ~ t, the
probability is smaller than ￿ that a male survivor has ability less than x.
(c) Given x > 0, there exists ~ t such that for t > ~ t, the expected ability (4)
of a male survivor is larger than x.
(d) Given x > 0, there exists ~ t such that for t > ~ t, the expected ability (5)
of a marginal male survivor is larger than x.
Proposition 4 [Gender-blind promotions without memory] Let c = c1;c2;:::ct;:::
be bounded, gender-blind promotion standards for a hierarchy without mem-
ory. Then there exists ~ t such that for t > ~ t, the survival rate of males is
smaller than the survival rate of females, but the surviving males have higher
expected ability.
The proposition follows from Lemma 3. That males eventually survive
with smaller probability than females follows directly from Lemma 3(a), by
choosing " > 0 such that (1 ￿ G(ct)) > " for all t. That male survivors
eventually have higher expected ability than surviving females follows by
choosing x in Lemma 3(c) to be larger than the (bounded) expected ability
of surviving females.
Now suppose that the survival rates are equal rather than that stan-
dards are gender blind. Then Proposition 5 says that the males￿promotion
standards cannot be bounded below. This can be interpreted to mean that
promotion standards become irrelevant; all surviving males are eventually
promoted.
Since the promotion standards for females are bounded, there will even-
tually be a stationary, positive measure of surviving females. Hence, the
population of surviving males must also become stationary with a positive
measure of survivors. But if the males￿promotion standards are bounded
below, males still have an opportunity to throw themselves out of the pool
at every stage, and their numbers will decline. To avoid this, the promotion
standards must become very low in order to keep all the males in the pool.
Males appear to be getting special treatment, but no males are pro￿ting from
the special treatment because their performance is well above the very low
standard.
13Proposition 5 [Equal survival rates in a hierarchy without memory] Let
(m;f) be promotion standards in a hierarchy without memory, such that
males and females have the same survival rates at each stage t. If the pro-
motion standards f are bounded, then the performance standards m are not
bounded below.






, t = 1;2;:::, converge to a positive number, say L >





, t = 1;2;:::,
converge to the same limit, L. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that
the sequence m is bounded below by m. Since (1￿￿(mtja)) ￿ (1￿￿(mja))

















Choose an " > 0 such that " < L. Choose ~ a;^ a such that ^ a < ~ a and
1 ￿ G(~ a) < "=3
G(^ a) < "=3
Due to the monotone likelihood ratio property, ￿(mja) decreases with a.
Choose ^ t such that (1￿￿(mj~ a))
^ t < "=3. Then if t > ^ t, the upper bound on





















< "=3 + (1 ￿ ￿(mj~ a))
t + "=3 < " < L
This is a contradiction.
Proposition 6 [Equal ability in a hierarchy without memory]
14(a) Suppose, in a hierarchy without memory, that the expected abilities
of surviving males and females are equal at stage ^ t under the promotion
standards (m;f). Then the female survival rate at stage ^ t is greater than the
male survival rate.
(b) In a hierarchy without memory, there are no bounded promotion stan-
dards (m;f) for which surviving males have the same average ability as sur-
viving females at each stage, t.
Proposition 6(a) follows directly from Lemma 1, which would otherwise
be contradicted. Proposition 6(b) follows from Lemma 3(c) by choosing x
larger than the expected ability of female survivors at every t.
4.2 The Hierarchy with Memory
I now show that, if the hierarchy has memory, males survive in the limit with
positive probability. As the hierarchy progresses, it is increasingly di¢ cult to
overturn a survivor￿ s accumulated success. Each new signal is blended into
the average, and its e⁄ect is therefore muted. Nevertheless, if the standards
are gender blind, it is still true that eventually a smaller proportion of males
than females survives, and they will have higher average ability. This must
be proved in a di⁄erent manner than the analogous result without memory
(Proposition 4), since the analog to Lemma 3 does not hold.
Proposition 8 follows from the shape of the limiting survival function
￿ SM (￿;c), described in Lemma 7 and shown in ￿gure 2. The proof is in the
appendix.
Lemma 7 [The limit distribution in a hierarchy with memory] Suppose that
the promotion standards are c = c1;c2:::ct;:::, and limsupct = ￿ c. For each
a ￿ ￿ c, ￿ SM (a;c) = 0. Given " > 0; for each a > ￿ c + ", ￿ SM (a;c) > 0.
Proposition 8 uses the hypothesis that promotion standards are non-
decreasing. With decreasing promotion standards, all females with ability










Figure 2: Survival in a Hierarchy with Memory
is not true of males. If the performance standards decrease rapidly, males
with abilities lower than c1 might survive in large numbers, and the limiting
expected ability of males could be lower than that of females. In any case,
increasing promotion standards are the more natural case.
Proposition 8 [Gender-blind promotions with memory] Let c = c1;c2:::ct;:::
be nondecreasing, gender-blind promotion standards that converge to ￿ c in a
hierarchy with memory. Then there exists ^ t such that for t > ^ t, the survival
rate of males is smaller than that of females, but the surviving males have
higher expected ability.
Proof Using Lemma 7, for a < ￿ c, neither males nor females survive. For
a > ￿ c, the probability that a female survives is one, while, for males, the
survival probability is less than one: ￿ SM (a;c) < 1 ￿ ￿(c1ja) < 1. Thus, the
limit survival rate of males is smaller than that of females.
Because the males￿limit probabilities of survival are nondecreasing with
a; and strictly increasing on some domain (since ￿ SM (a;c) > ￿ SM (￿ c;c) for
some a > c), the limit distribution of their abilities ￿rst-order dominates the
16limit distribution of females￿abilities. Thus, the expected ability of surviving
males is greater than that of surviving females.
Proposition 9 [Equal average ability with memory] Suppose the hierarchy
has memory, and suppose that (m;f) are promotion standards such that the
expected abilities of a random surviving male and a random surviving female
are equal at stage t. Then the survival rate of females at stage t is greater
than that of males.
Proposition 9 follows directly from Lemma 1.
5 Private Objective Functions
So far, the strategy of this paper has been to study the promotion standards
that satisfy some social objective, such as equal survival rates of males and
females or gender-blind standards, and to show the con￿ icts that are created.
I now characterize the promotion standards that will arise without legal
constraints. I will not start from the premise that employers dislike diversity,
or that they are willing to sacri￿ce pro￿t in order to avoid it, but rather
from the premise that employers are pro￿t maximizers whose decisions may
nevertheless lead to disparate impacts. The objective is to see which of
the social goals are preserved, if any, and whether ￿discrimination￿can be
identi￿ed.9
The implicit assumption in what follows is that wages can be di⁄erent at
di⁄erent stages of the hierarchy, but wages cannot be di⁄erent for males and
females, and wages do not depend directly on signals.
9The conceit in this paper is that promotion standards are set according to some well
conceived objective, either constrained by law, or guided by pro￿t, but not guided by
reference to the pool that is already promoted. For an interesting discussion of the latter,
see Sobel (2001).
175.1 Promotions across ￿rms
Suppose that, to be promoted, an agent must get a job with a di⁄erent
employer. An employer hiring at t selects from the survivors to t ￿ 1. This
creates externalities among ￿rms, since the distribution of abilities in an
employer￿ s pool is determined by previous employers￿promotion decisions.
Because an employer retains its workers for a single period, its sole ob-
jective is to take the workers with highest ability. For each t = 1;2;:::, let
Wt be the pro￿t objective when the industry does not have memory, and let
￿ Wt be the objective when the industry has memory:





t (a;m)g (a)da +
Z 1
ft
(a ￿ wt)g (a)da
￿ Wt (m;f) = (11b)
Z 1
￿1
(a ￿ wt) ￿ S
M
t (a;m)g (a)da +
Z 1
ft
(a ￿ wt)g (a)da
The pro￿t function is an aggregate for all employers at stage t. The wage
rate is wt, and ability a is understood as the pro￿t of employing an agent
with ability a. I assume that the wages are bounded and nondecreasing, and
converge to ￿ w. This will imply that the female promotion standards f are
bounded and nondecreasing, and also converge.10
It is straightforward to show that the optimal standards equalize the
expected abilities of marginal survivors:
Lemma 10 If the promotion standards (m;f) maximize total ability net of
wages, (11a) (respectively, (11b)), then the standards (mt;ft) equalize the
abilities of marginal males and marginal females at t. In particular, (12a)
(respectively, (12b)) holds.
e
M [Ajm;t] ￿ wt = ft ￿ wt = 0 (12a)
￿ e
M [Ajm;t] ￿ wt = ft ￿ wt = 0 (12b)
10In (11a) and (11b), that is why I wrote the objective function for females with a
minimum ability ft rather than maxd￿t ffdg.
18Proposition 11 characterizes the standards that will arise endogenously
when promotions are across ￿rms. Males will be held to a higher standard at
the earliest stage provided fewer than half are promoted, but in the hierarchy
without memory, males will eventually be promoted on weak performance,
much weaker than required of females. This is for a reason similar to when
standards are chosen to equalize promotion rates (Proposition 5). If the
males￿promotion standards did not become low, males would keep throwing
themselves out of the pool, and the expected ability of the marginal (and
average) survivor would keep rising. But if the objective is to stop them
from getting thrown out of the pool, and hence to equalize the abilities of
marginal survivors, then the males￿standard must become low. A male￿ s
probability of generating such a low standard must go to zero.
For the hierarchy with memory, I will use Assumption B in order to avoid
complicated arguments based on rates of convergence.
Assumption B: In the limit of the hierarchy with memory, each male￿ s
ability is known, and the distribution of males￿abilities has the limit distri-
bution (7).
Since the abilities of males are revealed in the limit, their standard for
promotion will ultimately be the same as for females. There will be marginal
females in the limit, in the sense that there remain a positive mass of females
with abilities in a neighborhood of the limit promotion standard, ￿ f. How-
ever, due to the selection process before reaching the limit, there will be no
marginal males. Proposition 11(b),(c) say that the probability of a risk-taker
being marginal at late stages of the hierarchy converges to zero.
In the hierarchy with memory, the marginal probability density of the
signal Zt at stage t is given by









Proposition 11 [Promotion standards that equalize the abilities of mar-
ginal survivors] Suppose that at each stage t, the promotion standards (m;f)
maximize total ability net of wages (11a) (respectively, (11b)), so that mar-
19ginal male and female survivors have equal expected abilities. Suppose As-
sumption A holds.
(a) Whether or not the hierarchy has memory, if m1 > 0, females face a
lower promotion standard than males at stage 1. That is, m1 > f1.
(b) Suppose the hierarchy does not have memory. Then males eventually
face lower promotion standards than females, but there are almost no mar-
ginal males. That is, given " > 0, there exists ~ t such that for t > ~ t, mt < ft
and ~ ￿t (mt) < ".
(c) Suppose the hierarchy has memory, and that Assumption B holds.
Then males eventually face the same promotion standards as females, but
there are almost no marginal males. In particular, limsupmt = limsupft.





Proof (a) It is enough to show that the expected ability of a marginal male
is less than his promotion standard m1. The expected ability of a marginal






g(a) ￿u (m1 ￿ a) R 1






g(m1 ￿ x) ￿u (x) R 1






g(m1 ￿ x) ￿u (x) R 1
￿1 g(a) ￿u (m1 ￿ a)da
dx < m1 (13)
The inequality follows because the integral in (13) is positive. The denomi-
nator is positive, and the numerator can be written
Z 1
0


















y [g(m1 ￿ y) ￿ g (m1 + y)] ￿
u (y)dy > 0
20In the second line, ￿u (y) = ￿u (￿y) due to symmetry of ￿u and in the last
line, [g(m1 ￿ y) ￿ g (m1 + y)] > 0 due to m 1 > 0, symmetry of g, and
single-peakedness of g.
(b) To show that mt < ft, let f and ￿ f be the lower and upper bounds
for f. Let x ￿ ￿ f. Using Lemma 3(d), if m is bounded, then for large t, the
expected ability of the marginal male survivor is larger than x, hence larger
than ft, a contradiction. Therefore m is not bounded, and in particular, is
not bounded below. Let ~ t be large enough that for t > ~ t, mt < f ￿ ft.
I now show that ~ ￿t (mt) < " for t > ~ t. Using Assumption A, an upper
bound for ￿(mtja) = ￿u (mt ￿ a) is ￿u (0). Let ￿;￿ > 0 such that ￿￿u (0) +
￿ < ".
Choose x > 0 and ~ t large enough so that ￿u (mt ￿ a) < ￿u ￿ ￿ f ￿ a
￿
< ￿




t (a;m) R 1
￿1 g(a)SM
t (a;m)dada < ￿. Then






































t (a;m) R 1
￿1 g (a)SM
t (a;m)da
da + ￿ < ￿
u (0)￿ + ￿ < "
(c) The pro￿t
R 1
￿ m (a ￿ ￿ w) ￿ SM (a;m)g (a)da is maximized by choosing




t (a;m)da < " for large t follows from Lemma 7
and ￿gure 2.
When the promotion standards equalize the expected abilities of marginal
survivors, both the survival rates and abilities of male and female survivors
will di⁄er. These di⁄erences have an e¢ ciency explanation, and in particular
do not follow from gender preferences on the part of employers.
However, disparate treatment due to a legitimate business objective is
hard to distinguish from disparate treatment due to gender preferences.
21Suppose, for example, that ￿rms choose promotion standards according
to the following ￿discriminatory￿objective:










If U is increasing, the objective explicitly favors males. But the standard for
males may still be higher at the beginning of the hierarchy than for females,
and lower at the end, whether the objective is W or W + U: Because of this
ambiguity, courts and policymakers may resort to procedural rules such as a
requirement for gender-blind standards or equal survival rates.
5.2 Promotions within the ￿rm: preserving options
Suppose now that all promotions take place within a single ￿rm. Then the
￿rm itself pro￿ts from the information it collects through its promotion de-
cisions. I show that the ￿rm has an incentive to keep a male in the pool at
early stages, despite a moderately bad signal, in order to collect more infor-
mation and preserve an option. In particular, I show that at an early stage
the ￿rm will retain males with lower expected ability than will be tolerated
in promoted females. In this sense, males are favored.
Consider a hierarchy with three stages (t =0,1,2) and two promotions
(at t =1,2). At stage 0, there is no employer, but agents generate signals
of ability. These are used for hiring in the ￿rst promotion stage. A ￿rm￿ s
objective function is equal to the sum of workers￿abilities in each promotion
period, net of wages.




(a ￿ w1)g (a)da +
Z 1
maxff1;f2g





(a ￿ w1)g (a)[1 ￿ ￿(m1ja)]da +
Z 1
￿1
(a ￿ w2)g (a)[1 ￿ ￿(m1ja)][1 ￿ ￿(m2ja)]da
In Proposition 12(a), I assume that wages in both periods are equal. This
22assumption isolates the incentive to preserve options from the problem that
the cost of a mistake is compounded when wages are increasing.
Proposition 12 [Preserving options within the ￿rm] Suppose there are three
periods with two promotions that take place within a single ￿rm. Suppose
the promotion standards (f1;f2);(m1;m2) maximize (14).
(a) Suppose that w1 = w2 = w. Then the expected ability of a marginal
male at the ￿rst promotion stage is smaller than the expected ability of a
marginal female. That is, eM [Ajm;1] < f1.
(b) The expected ability of a marginal male at the ￿nal promotion stage
is the same as that of a marginal female. That is, eM [Ajm;2] = f2.
Proof Since wages are nondecreasing, the optimum of (14) satis￿es
f1 = w1 (15)
f2 = w2 (16)
R 1
￿1 (a ￿ w1)g (a)￿(m1ja)da+ R 1
￿1 (a ￿ w2)g (a)￿(m1ja)[1 ￿ ￿(m2ja)]da = 0 (17)
Z 1
￿1
(a ￿ w2)g (a)[1 ￿ ￿(m1ja)]￿(m2ja)da = 0 (18)








g (￿ + w)￿(m1j￿ + w)d￿
Write M2 for the probability of being a marginal male in the ￿rst promotion








g (￿ + w)￿(m1j￿ + w)[1 ￿ ￿(m2j￿ + w)]d￿












g (￿ + w)￿(m1j￿ + w)[1 ￿ ￿(m2j￿ + w)]
M2
d￿ = 0
The density in the ￿rst integral of (20) describes the males who were marginal
at the ￿rst promotion. The density in the second integral of (20) describes
the males remaining from that group after the second promotion. Because
￿(m2j￿ + w) is decreasing with ￿, the distribution in the second integral
stochastically dominates the distribution in the ￿rst integral. Because of
stochastic dominance, the expected ability represented by the ￿rst integral is
smaller than the expected ability represented by the second integral. Since












g (a)￿(m2ja)[1 ￿ ￿(m2ja)] R 1
￿1 g (a)￿(m2ja)[1 ￿ ￿(m2ja)]da
da
Using (15), the ￿rst inequality implies eM [Ajm;1] < w = f1. This proves
(a).
Part (b) follows from (16), which says f2 = w2, and from (18), which says
eM [Ajm;2] = w2.
When promotions are within the ￿rm, one cannot say in general whether
males will be promoted at a lower or higher standard than females at the
￿rst stage, but conditional on a given standard for females, more males will
be promoted within the ￿rm than if promotions were across ￿rms. Again,
this is because the ￿rm internalizes the information it generates by keeping
males in the pool.
Finally, Proposition 12 also describes the optimal policy when the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t depends on the signals produced by the workers rather than on their
24abilities. For example, the value produced in an academic labor market is
the quality of the papers written, rather than the ability of the professor who





(a ￿ w1)g (a)da +
Z 1
f2












(z2 ￿ w1)g (a)[1 ￿ ￿(m1ja)][1 ￿ ￿(m2ja)]￿(z2ja)dz2da
But, integrating on z1 and z2, since
R 1
￿1 z￿(zja)dz = a, it holds that
￿z (f1;f2;m1;m2) = ￿(f1;f2;m1;m2).
6 Conclusion
A¢ rmative action policies have been justi￿ed and evaluated from many dif-
ferent perspectives, on both e¢ ciency grounds and equity grounds. For the
most part, economists have focussed on e¢ ciency, especially productive ef-
￿ciency. For example, Holzer and Neumark (2000) argue from an extensive
empirical literature that ￿a¢ rmative action o⁄ers signi￿cant redistribution
toward women and minorities, with relatively small e¢ ciency consequences￿
(page 559). Among the ingenious theoretical arguments for why a¢ rmative
action policies enhance e¢ ciency are those of Lundberg and Startz (1983) and
Lundberg (1991), who consider a model of statistical discrimination where
wages depend on imperfect signals of ability. They show, among other things,
that the pooling of workers with di⁄erent signaling ability creates more in-
centive to invest in human capital. Milgrom and Oster (1987) argue that
a¢ rmative action policies can e¢ ciently prevent employers from underpro-
moting women and minorities. The incentive to underpromote derives from
a fear of revealing the worth of their employees to rival ￿rms, a threat which
is higher for the more ￿invisible￿workers, such as women and minorities.
I have not made e¢ ciency central to my analysis, since it is unclear how
to de￿ne it in the context studied here. I have taken the social objectives of
gender blindness or equal promotions as primitive, rather than deriving those
25objectives from a welfare function. This has allowed me to illuminate con￿ icts
among those objectives that derive from gender di⁄erences in behavior, in
particular, risk taking. I have simply assumed that males are hard-wired
for risk taking and females are not, and that all agents want to stay in the
hierarchy if allowed.
The e¢ ciency criterion that springs to mind for most economists is that
marginal survivors should have the same expected ability. This is the cri-
terion that drives promotion standards when promotions are across ￿rms,
but only because the employers do not internalize the bene￿ts of collecting
information on risk takers, which can possibly create a better pool for the
long run. When promotions are within ￿rms, the ￿rm has an incentive to
preserve an option on males at the beginning, since more information will
be collected later. The ￿rm itself pro￿ts from this information. Thus, the
promotion standards will be such that the marginal male has lower expected
ability than the marginal female, and in this sense, males are favored. How-
ever, the promotion standard itself may be higher for males than for females
in both cases.
There are many other gender di⁄erences at work as well. Some of these
di⁄erences can be confounding factors that overturn any intrinsic di⁄erence
in risk taking. In particular, Becker and Eagly (2004) found that females were
at least as likely as males to put themselves at risk in protecting Jews in the
Holocaust, and females are considerably more likely to put themselves at risk
by donating kidneys to relatives in need. However, the authors hypothesize
that such behavior might be rooted in a greater willingness of females to
care for others, or to heed an ethical calling. Females may be motivated by
objectives that overcome, and therefore obscure, an aversion to risk.
Further, as I mentioned in the introduction, the noisiness of the signals is
not entirely under the control of the employee. Even if males are more risk-
taking, they may be more closely observed within each promotion period
than females. The latter hypothesis is consonant with the Milgrom and
Oster (1987) ￿invisibility￿hypothesis. If that e⁄ect is strong enough, then
females should be understood as the workers who present noisy signals, and
the males should be understood as generating more accurate signals.
In any case, the main point of the paper is that gender di⁄erences in
tastes set up a con￿ ict between procedural fairness and disparate impacts.
26Di⁄erences in risk taking are one example of that larger point.11 A legiti-
mate business purpose is a defense to disparate impact, but as mentioned in
section 5, a legitimate business purpose cannot always be distinguished from
discriminatory intent.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The same argument applies whether the survival rates are calculated with

































































In the third line, where (a ￿ ft) < 0, it holds that SF
t (a;f) = 0 and
0 < SM








t (A;f)] > 0, so the inte-
grand is negative. In the fourth line, where (a ￿ ft) ￿ 0, it holds that
0 < SM
t (a;m) < 1 = SF





















































11In a model where the signal for promotion depends on e⁄ort, Bardsley and Sherstyuk
(2006) show that di⁄erences in the cost of e⁄ort can also lead to di⁄erent promotion rates.
27Proof of Lemma 3
Let m ￿ mt ￿ ￿ m for all t = 1;2;::: Since the distributions G and ￿ have
full support, the probability that any male survives at any date t, conditional
on having survived to t￿1, is strictly less than one. That is, 1￿￿(mtja) < 1
for every t and every a 2 R:
(a) Let " > 0. Let ~ a > 0 satisfy 0 < 1 ￿ G(~ a) < "=2 and let ~ t satisfy
(1 ￿ ￿(mja))



























< G(~ a)"=2 + (1 ￿ G(~ a) < "
(b) Given x 2 R; the probability that a random male survivor has ability
































t (x;m)da + G(x)
(22)
Using the boundedness of m, and the fact that ￿(mdja) decreases with a due










! 1 for a > x (23)
28Thus, (22) converges to one as t becomes large. The result follows.
(c) For given t, write the expected ability of surviving males, EM [Ajm;t],
in two parts. The ￿rst term in (24) is the expected ability of survivors who
satisfy jAj > 4x, times the probability of that event, and the second part is
the expected ability of survivors who satisfy jAj ￿ 4x, times the probability
of that event.
E
M [Ajm;t;jAj > 4x] ￿Pr[jAj > 4x] + E































































Since Pr[jAj > 4x] + Pr[jAj ￿ 4x] =1, and EM [Ajm;t;jAj ￿ 4x] > ￿4x, it
will be enough to show that as t becomes large, EM [Ajm;t;jAj > 4x] becomes
large (larger than 2x) and Pr[jAj ￿ 4x] becomes small (smaller than 1/6).
Then EM [Ajm;t] > (2x)(5=6) ￿ (4x)(1=6) = x.
First show that EM [Ajm;t;jAj > 4x] > 2x for large t.
E






















































29Using the boundedness of m, and the fact that ￿(mdja) decreases with









[1 ￿ ￿(mdj ￿ 4x)]









[1 ￿ ￿(mdj ￿ 4x)]
! 1 for a > 4x (27)
The value of (25) is less than 4x, since the numerator adds a negative term
to 4x, and the denominator of (25) is greater than one. However, using
the fact that
R ￿4x
￿1 ag (a)da is ￿nite12 and using (26),(27), it follows that the
negative term in the numerator vanishes for large enough t: Using (27), the
second term of the denominator of (25) vanishes as t becomes large, and we
can therefore assert that EM [Ajm;t;jAj > 4x] > 2x for large enough t.
I now show that Pr[jAj ￿ 4x] < 1=6 for large enough t.






































The result follows from (23), substituting 4x for x, since the denominator
becomes large.
(d) I omit the proof, which is essentially the same as for part (c), replacing
EM [Ajm;t] with eM [Ajm;t], and using the fact that ￿ is bounded.
Proof of Lemma 7
The sequence c = c1;c2;:::ct;::: contains at most a ￿nite number of values
larger than ￿ c+". Let ￿ t be the largest value of t in this set, that is, the latest
date such that ct > ￿ c + ". (If the sequence is increasing as in Proposition 8,
one can take " = 0 and ￿ t = 0:) Because ￿ has full support, there is a positive
probability of survival to time ￿ t, regardless of ability, that is, ￿ SM




￿1 a2g (a)da is ￿nite because variance is ￿nite.
30That ￿ SM
t (a;c) ! 0 for a < ￿ c follows because ￿ Zt converges in probability
to a and a < ￿ c.
That ￿ SM
t (￿ c;c) ! 0 follows from the central limit theorem. When a = ￿ c,
the limit distribution of
p
t
￿ ￿ Zt ￿ ￿ c
￿
=v is normal, centered at 0, where v2 is
the variance of ￿. With positive probability it holds that
p
t
￿ ￿ Zt ￿ ￿ c
￿
=v < 0.
But since survival requires that ￿ Zt ￿ ￿ c ￿ 0 for all t = 1;2;:::, the joint
probability of survival at t = 1;2;::: falls to zero.
I now show that for a > ￿ c + "; ￿ SM (a;c) > 0.
For arbitrary dates t1;t2, it is useful to introduce the notation ￿ Z
t2
t1 as the






The previous notation ￿ Zt becomes ￿ Zt
0.
Let P (a;c;￿ t;Z) be the probability that an agent with ability A = a
survives in the limit, conditional on having survived to ￿ t with average signal
￿ Z
￿ t
0 = Z 2 R. Survival implies that Z ￿ c￿ t. Given a and Z, write
















￿ t : t = ￿ t + 1;￿ t + 2;:::
￿
is the random variable.
It is enough to show that P (a;c;￿ t;Z) > 0 for all a > ￿ c + " and all
Z ￿ c￿ t: Since ￿ has full support, ￿ SM
￿ t (a;c) > 0 for all abilities a. Therefore
if P (a;c;￿ t;Z) > 0 for all a > ￿ c + " and Z ￿ c￿ t; it holds that ￿ SM (a;c) > 0
for a > ￿ c + ".
The ￿rst line below follows from (28), because c￿ t > ct, hence, using
Z ￿ c￿ t > ct, it holds that Z ￿ ct for all t > ￿ t. Therefore the event ￿ ￿ Zt











￿ t ￿ ct for all t = ￿ t + 1;￿ t + 2;:::
￿
,
but not vice versa.
The second line is a change of notation. In the third line, the constant
value a is subtracted from both sides of the inequality. The fourth line uses
the fact that c￿+￿ t ￿ ￿ c + " for all ￿ > 0. The ￿fth line follows because the
31distribution of signals is atomless.
P (a;c;￿ t;Z) > Pr
￿ ￿ Z
t




















0 ￿ a > ￿ c + " ￿ a for all ￿ = 1;2;:::
￿
For a > c + ", choose b1;b2 > 0 so that ￿b1v2 ￿ b2 = ￿ c + " ￿ a. Then
P (a;c;￿ t;Z) > Pr
￿ ￿ Z
￿





0 ￿ a > ￿b1v





0 ￿ a > ￿b1v
2 ￿ b2=￿ for all ￿ = 1;2;:::
￿
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